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AGREEING IN THE SHADOW OF THE POLICY:
HOW CORPORATE INSURANCE POLICIES IMPACT
THE RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENTAL
INVESTIGATIONS INTO CORPORATE CRIME
***

BETH OLSEN*

Since 1999, prosecutors have increasingly utilized deferred
prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs)
to resolve investigations into corporate criminal conduct. Corporations are
often eager to enter into such agreements in order to avoid indictment,
believing that the consequences set forth in the terms of the DPA or NPA
are less harmful than are the consequences of a corporate indictment.
However, the impact that a DPA or NPA may have on a corporation’s
insurance coverage may not be readily apparent or even contemplated
when the corporation elects to enter into the agreement.
This Note analyzes the ways in which corporate insurance
coverage interacts with and is impacted by white-collar criminal
investigations and the resolution of such investigations through the use of
NPAs and DPAs. Specifically, this Note discusses situations in which
corporations have lost insurance coverage as a result of entrance into a
DPA or NPA and identifies ways in which such consequences could be
avoided. Finally, this Note anticipates the impact that the Department of
Justice’s (DOJ) new emphasis on individual prosecution for white-collar
crimes will have on corporate insurance availability and policies.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

When a corporation finds itself under criminal investigation by
federal prosecutors, it will likely attempt to resolve the investigation by
entering into a DPA or NPA.1 From a risk aversion perspective, it makes

* University of Pennsylvania, J.D. 2016. I would like to thank Professor Mary
Mulligan and Judge Cheryl Ann Krause for their assistance and support on this
project, and Professor Tom Baker for sparking my interest in insurance law during
my first year of law school in his torts class.
1
NPAs and DPAs are agreements between the government and a corporate
entity (or, less commonly, an individual) that is alleged to have engaged in some
kind of wrongdoing. The agreement may impose upon the corporation a range of
sanctions such as fines, restitution, institutional changes, and additional reporting
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sense that a corporation would prefer to accept the known costs associated
with entering into a DPA or NPA rather than face the uncertain, and
potentially devastating consequences of a corporate indictment, trial or
even conviction. 2 This fear of indictment gives prosecutors enormous
leverage in any negotiation with a corporation relating to the corporation’s
allegedly criminal conduct. Although some critics maintain that DPAs and
NPAs exploit the appreciably unequal bargaining power between
prosecutors and corporations, 3 corporations appear rational in seeking to
enter into DPAs or NPAs, despite their burdensome conduct requirements,
sizeable penalties and often-unfavorable admissions. This risk aversion
rationale is premised on the expectation that a corporation understands and
can compare the relative costs of a DPA or NPA, on the one hand, and of
the consequences of non-cooperation (such as an indictment, trial or
conviction), on the other. Thus, corporate counsel should be well aware of
the collateral consequences that can flow from a DPA or NPA in
determining how valuable such an agreement is and what concessions a
corporation should be willing to make within the agreement, so as to ensure
that entering into a DPA or NPA will produce a better outcome for the
corporation than would non-cooperation.
or cooperation duties. In exchange for the corporation’s acceptance of the
sanctions, the government agrees not to prosecute in a non-prosecution agreement,
or the government agrees to dismiss filed charges in a deferred prosecution
agreement. The government’s agreement to refrain from prosecuting or dismiss
charges is contingent upon the corporation’s adherence to the terms of the
agreement, which can be quite onerous. See generally Roma W. Theus II, What
Cooperating with the Government Really Means for a Company, 48 No. 1 DRI
FOR DEF. 32 (Jan. 2006).
2
A person or entity is risk averse where the certainty equivalent, meaning the
amount they are willing to pay or accept to avoid a high risk gamble, is greater
than the expected value of taking the risk.
3
See, e.g., James R. Copland, The Shadow Regulatory State: The Rise of
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, CIV. JUST. REP., May 2012, at 1,
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjr_14.htm (discussing how prosecutors
have ample bargaining power to force companies to “implement onerous training
and reporting programs, hire senior officials to oversee companies' compliance'
with prosecutors' legal interpretations, modify sales-force practices and
compensation plans, contract with independent ‘monitors' empowered to dictate
modifications to business practices, and even fire and replace directors or chief
executives”); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV.
853, 853 (2007) (identifying and discussing “some indications of [prosecutorial]
overreaching, if perhaps not abuse of prosecutorial discretion”).
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This paper will discuss the subtle, but significant, impact that
DPAs and NPAs can have on a corporation's access to the benefits of its
insurance coverage. Part II will discuss the functions of insurance in
society, and provide a breakdown of the different types of corporate
insurance coverage that is available, both for individuals and for corporate
entities. Part III lays out the evolution of the guidelines that have been
promulgated for prosecutors concerning how to make charging decisions in
the corporate context. Part IV will present a discussion of the impact that
corporate insurance has had on corporate cooperation and prosecutorial
discretion, as demonstrated through an analysis of DPAs and NPAs. Part
IV provides specific examples of past DPAs or NPAs that have jeopardized
or eliminated a corporation’s insurance coverage and lays out new
insurance concerns for corporate counsel to consider when entering into
DPAs and NPAs in light of the DOJ’s recent shift towards increasing
individual accountability for corporate crimes.
II.

THE PURPOSE OF INSURANCE GENERALLY AND
INSURANCE IN THE CORPORATE SETTING
A.

THE GENERAL GOALS OF INSURANCE

One of the primary purposes of insurance is to take risks that
would otherwise be borne entirely by an individual or a corporate entity
and distribute the costs of such risks efficiently throughout a larger
population. 4 In considering the extent to which a prosecutor might
contemplate a corporate defendant’s insurance coverage in making
charging decisions and entering into agreements, it is important to be
thinking about what types of corporate conduct we want to be insurable,
and the potential impact of such insurability on the deterrent goals of the
criminal justice system. At the same time, the interest in deterrence should
be balanced against the restitutionary interest of compensating the victims
of corporate malfeasance.5

For an interesting discussion of how the economic justifications for
insurance in a corporate setting differs from those that are applicable to individuals
see Kenneth A. Froot, David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy Stein, Risk Management:
Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies, 40 J. FIN., 1629, 16391658 (1993).
5
The extent to which the criminal justice system’s interest in deterrence
should yield to, or even consider, the restitutionary interests of victims in being
4
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Where a corporation may face other liabilities or losses related to
the conduct covered by a NPA or DPA, should such losses or liabilities be
uninsurable as a matter of public policy or be cast outside the scope of a
policy’s coverage because of the contents of a contract between the
government and the corporation?6 In situations when a corporate entity is
itself subjected to criminal charges, the prosecuting governmental entity
will consider whether a charging decision is likely to result in rendering the
corporation insolvent, potentially jeopardizing thousands of jobs.7
In much the same way that individuals pay premiums to secure
health insurance coverage in the event that they experience a costly medical
expense in the future, corporations purchase a range of insurance products
to protect against potential astronomical liabilities that could threaten their
compensated when making charging decisions is not something that has been
clearly established. This is in part because restitution or victim compensation may
be considered a goal of both the civil and criminal justice systems, and there is
debate as to the system to which it most appropriately belongs. See Bridgett N.
Shephard, Classifying Crime Victim Restitution: The Theoretical Arguments and
Practical Consequences of Labeling Restitution as Either a Criminal or Civil Law
Concept, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 801, 808 (2014) (“Victim restitution has
commonly been cited as an example of the blurring between civil and criminal law.
Some commentators argue that restitution is clearly a civil idea, and others argue
that it is clearly criminal. Other commentators believe that restitution is a hybrid
criminal-civil concept, while still others see restitution as neither criminal nor civil,
but rather, as a concept that is sui generis, something entirely of its own likeness
that cannot be based on existing legal frameworks.”). Restitution to victims of
corporate crime may be accomplished through civil suits, through the award of
damages, but DPAs and NPAs may provide for the establishment of trusts for
compensation of victims and will consider the extent to which the corporation has
made efforts to make full restitution in determining a suitable penalty. See e.g.,
Press Release, DOJ, SunTrust Mortgage Agrees to $320 Million Settlement (July
3, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/suntrust-mortgage-agrees-320-millionsettlement (explaining that SunTrust’s Agreement with the DOJ required SunTrust
to pay $179 million in restitution to compensate borrowers for damage caused by
its conduct, and further, that if more than $179 million was needed to sufficiently
compensate the victims, the bank would guarantee an additional $95 million for
additional restitution).
6
Whether, as a policy matter insurance coverage should be available to cover
the penalties agreed upon in a DPA or NPA is outside the scope of this paper. As a
practical matter, such coverage is usually precluded based on state public policy or
insurance policy exclusions. N.Y. Ins. Law § 1101(a)(1) (McKinney 2000).
7
This consideration has been particularly compelling in the wake of Arthur
Anderson’s collapse following its indictment related to providing accounting
services to Enron, which will be discussed more extensively later on in this paper.
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solvency. These types of general corporate liability insurance policies
function as cover for the corporate entity itself. Although they may operate
indirectly to protect the interests of a corporation’s executives, by helping
to maintain share prices in the face of litigation or preventing a corporation
from becoming insolvent due to the owing of a massive claim, the policies
themselves do not provide coverage for the individual executives. Thus, in
addition to purchasing insurance coverage for liabilities incurred by the
corporate entity, most corporations also secure coverage for the directors
and officers of their corporation through D&O Policies.
B.

COVERAGE FOR THE CORPORATE ENTITY

Corporations have a range of different insurance products available
to protect the corporate entity both from potential liabilities to third parties,
risks inherent in their business, and a host of other hazards. For instance,
car manufacturers have commercial liability policies protecting them from
potential tort claims related to their cars, energy companies have property
insurance protecting their power plants. Generally, these policies have
provisions which cover actual settlements or liabilities resulting from
litigation, provide for a legal defense (or the costs of one), and losses
incurred by the corporation as a result of property damage or some other
event.
C.

COVERAGE FOR INDIVIDUALS: INDEMNIFICATION AND D&O
POLICIES

When an individual serves as a director or officer of a corporation,
he is subjected to the risk of being sued as an individual when his decisions
or conduct in running the corporation results in some sort of litigation.
Additionally, serving as an officer of a corporation may expose an
individual to an array of expenses associated with defending governmental
agency investigations for actions that he has taken in his official capacity.8

Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged that a corporation’s
capacity to indemnify its officers serves the dual policies of “(a) allowing
corporate officials to resist unjustified lawsuits, secure in the knowledge that, if
vindicated, the corporation will bear the expense of litigation; and (b) encouraging
capable women and men to serve as corporate directors and officers, secure in the
knowledge that the corporation will absorb the cost of defending their honesty and
integrity.” See VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1998).
8
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Given these risks, it makes sense that a corporation seeking to recruit the
best and the brightest individuals to serve as its officers would want to
protect them against the aforementioned risks to the extent that is allowable
by law.9 One way in which corporations “insure” their executive officers
against these risks is by providing for the indemnification of such officers.
In addition to indemnification, corporations are explicitly permitted to
purchase D&O liability insurance policies for the protection of corporate
directors and officers, even when the corporation could not itself indemnify
the individual.10
Indemnification refers to the reimbursement by the corporation of
liabilities, including judgments, amounts paid in settlement expenses, and
attorneys' fees incurred by directors, officers, employees, and sometimes
agents in the course of their service to the corporation. Such
indemnification is vital in that it “encourages corporate service by capable
individuals by protecting their personal financial resources from depletion
by the expenses they incur during an investigation or litigation that results

As will be discussed more extensively in the below section regarding
uninsurable and unindemnifiable risks, state law and public policy objections
sometimes prohibit the purchasing of insurance for certain types of risks and
losses. See e.g., Level 3 Comm., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2001)
(disgorgement of unlawfully obtained funds was uninsurable as a matter of state
public policy); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 3d 74,
77-78 (1987); Wausau Ins. Co. v. Valspar Corp., 594 F. Supp. 269, 273 (N.D. Ill.
1984); Grant v. North River Ins. Co., 453 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Ind. 1978)
(punitive damage awards uninsurable as matter of public policy); see also
Checkley v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 100 N.E 942, 944 (Ill. 1913) (“A fire insurance
policy issued to anyone, which purported to insure his property against his own
willful and intentional burning of the same, would manifestly be condemned by all
courts as contrary to a sound public policy...”).
10
State laws expressly permit corporations to purchase D&O insurance. See
e.g., 8 DEL. LAWS § 145(g) (1953) (“A corporation shall have power to purchase
and maintain insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer,
employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the
corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation,
partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise against any liability asserted
against such person and incurred by such person in any such capacity, or arising
out of such person's status as such, whether or not the corporation would have the
power to indemnify such person against such liability under this section.”); 32 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5 § 8.75(g) (2012) (authorizing Illinois corporations to purchase
D&O insurance).
9

2017

CORPORATE INSURANCE POLICIES

355

by reason of that service.”11 Corporate indemnification can be voluntarily
assumed by a corporation through the corporation’s bylaws or other
founding documents (permissive indemnification), or may also be
mandatory in certain situations under state law (mandatory
indemnification).12
Under Delaware law,13 a corporation has broad discretion to enter
into indemnification agreements with its officers or draft provisions of its
bylaws providing indemnification beyond that which is explicitly
contemplated by the state statute (§145). 14 Section 145 applies to any
person involved in actual or threatened litigation or an investigation by
reason of his status as an officer, director, employee, or agent of the
corporation or of another entity he or she served at the request of the
indemnifying corporation.15 Specifically, §145(a) permits indemnification
of officers, directors, employees, or agents for attorneys' fees and other
expenses, as well as judgments or amounts paid in settlements in civil cases
brought by third parties.16
Although the advancement of fees is a distinct concept from
indemnification, the Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged,
“advancement is an especially important corollary to indemnification as an
inducement for attracting capable individuals into corporate service.” 17
Section 145(e) permits the advancement of attorneys' fees and other legal
expenses to officers and directors in connection with defending any civil,

Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204 (Del. 2005).
See generally Stacy Kalberman, Director and Officer Liability: An
Overview of Corporate and Insurance Indemnification, 7 No. 4 ANDREWS SEC.
LITIG. & REG. REP. 17 (2001) (corporations are typically required by statute to
indemnify directors and officers for the cost of their defense where the officer or
director has prevailed in litigation or other proceedings).
13
Delaware law is a good place to look for the general provisions concerning
corporate indemnification. This is because Delaware is the most favored state of
incorporation for U.S. businesses and home to more than half of the corporations
that make up the Fortune 500. See L.S. Black, Why Corporations Choose
Delaware, DEL. DEP’T OF STATE (2007), http://corp.delaware.gov/pdfs/
whycorporations_english.pdf.
14
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1953) [hereinafter Section 145].
15
Id.
16
See Cochran v. Stifel Fin. Corp., C.A. No. 17350 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2000),
slip op. at 26-29; In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., C.A.
No. 5430-VCS (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011), slip op. at 38 n.123.
17
Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005).
11
12
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criminal, administrative, or investigative proceeding. These expenses may
be paid “in advance of the final disposition” of the proceeding.
Corporations generally have fairly wide latitude in determining the
conditions under which they will advance defense costs to a director or
officer, subject to Section 145(e)’s requirement that such advancement be
conditioned “upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of such
director or officer to repay such amount if it shall ultimately be determined
that he is not entitled to be indemnified by the corporation.” 18 When a
corporation adopts charter provisions or otherwise provides for broad,
mandatory advancement to the fullest extent allowable under the law, a
corporation must advance such funds upon receipt of an undertaking, and
may not stop such advancement until the conclusion of the proceeding if it
is determined that the individual did not meet the standard of conduct for
indemnification under Delaware law.19
There are several limitations on the circumstances in which a
corporation may indemnify an officer. First, a corporation may not
indemnify an officer who has not “acted in good faith and in a manner he []
reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best interests of the
corporation.” 20 Second, in criminal matters, a corporation may only
indemnify when, in addition to acting in good faith, the officer did not have
reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful.21 Third, in actions
brought by or in the right of the corporation (such as derivative actions), a
corporation may indemnify only for expenses and attorneys fees, and
cannot indemnify at all “in respect of any claim, issue or matter as to which
[an officer] shall have been adjudged to be liable to the corporation.” 22
These limitations on the extent of corporate indemnification do not apply to
the scope of D&O coverage.23 When a corporation is unable to indemnify

Del. C. § 145; But see Homestore, 888 A.2d at 211 (explaining that § 145(e)
of Delaware's statute “provides corporations with the flexibility to advance funds
to former corporate officials…without an express undertaking.”).
19
See Blankenship v. Alpha Appalachia Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 10610-CB
(Del. Ch. May 28, 2015) (holding that where corporation agreed to advance
defense costs to fullest extent allowed under law, the corporation could not later
condition the advancement upon the individual’s statements regarding his belief
that he believed he had acted lawfully).
20
Section 145.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
See id. § 145(g) (providing that a corporation can buy D&O insurance even
when it would not have the power to personally indemnify directors or officers).
18
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its officer, the officer may still be covered under his D&O policy.24 Thus,
D&O policies can function as an important safety net for an officer in
situations where, for whatever reason, the corporation cannot or will not
indemnify him.25
A typical D&O policy contains three different types of coverage;
“Side A” coverage, which protects individual managers directly from the
risk of shareholder litigation (so reimbursement for claims is paid directly
to the officers), “Side B” coverage, which reimburses the corporation for its
indemnification payments to officers and directors, and “Side C” coverage,
which protects the corporation from the risk of shareholder litigation to
which the corporate entity itself is a party. A standard insuring clause
within a D&O policy provides:
(For Side A) This policy shall pay the Loss of each and
every Director or Officer of the Company arising from a
Claim first made against the Directors or Officers during
the Policy Period ... for any actual or alleged Wrongful Act
occurring on or prior to the Effective Time in their
respective capacities as Directors or Officers of the
Company, except when and to the extent that the Company
... has indemnifed the Directors or Officers. The Insurer
shall ... advance Defense Costs of such Claim prior to its
final disposition.26
(For Side B) The Insurer shall reimburse the Company for
Loss arising from any claim first made against the Insureds
and reported to the Insurer during the Policy Period by
reason of any Wrongful Act but only when and to the
extent the Company has indemnified the Insureds for such
Loss pursuant to law, statutory or common, or pursuant to
See also Stacy Kalberman, Director and Officer Liability: An Overview of
Corporate and Insurance Indemnification, 11 ANDREWS’ PROF. LIAB. LITIG. REP.
18 (2001).
24
However, as will be discussed further below, D&O policies contain a
number of exclusions, so it is possible that a corporation will be unable to
indemnify an officer and the officer’s conduct will fall within an exclusion under
the D&O policy and thus the officer will have no coverage either through
indemnification or his D&O insurance.
25
Kalberman, supra note 23, at 3.
26
See, e.g., In re Allied Digital Techs Corp., 306 B.R. 505, 510 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2004).
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the Charter or By-Laws of the Company.27
These policies will often contain a number of exclusions, some of
which are relevant in the context of a corporate criminal investigation or
the ensuing civil litigation. “Conduct” exclusions eliminate coverage for
particular conduct that is considered so self-serving or egregious that
insurance coverage is deemed inappropriate. These “conduct” exclusions
preclude coverage for dishonest or fraudulent acts28; claims alleging that
directors engaged in conduct detrimental to the corporation for their own
personal gain; willful violation of the law; and illegal renumeration. 29
“Prior Claims” exclusions eliminate coverage under the policy in situations
where the insured corporation or officer was on notice of a claim or a claim
was actually pending prior to the commencement of the policy period. 30
Additionally, many D&O policies will exclude coverage for claims “made
against the Insureds...based upon or arising out of any deliberate…act or
omission by such Insureds.”31

See Jennifer M. Schwartz, Insurance Defense Costs in a Mixed Action:
Scope of Duty: D&O Insurers, 28 CBA REC. 28, at 29 (2014) (citing Art
Bookbinders of Am., Inc. v. Tudor Ins. Co., 409 Ill. App. 3d 1144, *11-12 (1st
Dist. June 7, 2011)).
28
See e.g., AIG, D&O Policy at 17, http://www.aig.com/public-companydo_295_391889.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2015) (excluding coverage for claims
“arising out of, based upon or attributable to the committing in fact of any
deliberate criminal or deliberate fraudulent act by the Insured.”).
29
See e.g., id. at 6 (excluding coverage for claims “arising out of, based upon
or attributable to payments to an Insured of any remuneration without the previous
approval of the stockholders or members of an Organization, which payment
without such previous approval shall be held to have been illegal.”).
30
See e.g., id. at 5 (excluding coverage for claims, “[a]lleging, arising out of,
based upon or attributable to the facts alleged, or to the same or related Wrongful
Acts alleged or contained in any Claim which has been reported, or in any
circumstances of which notice has been given, under any policy of which this
policy is a renewal or replacement or which it may succeed in time…[and] any
pending or prior: (1) litigation; or (2) administrative or regulatory proceeding or
investigation of which an Insured had notice, or alleging or derived from the same
or essentially the same facts as alleged in such pending or prior litigation or
administrative or regulatory proceeding or investigation…[and] if any Insured, as
of such Continuity Date, knew or could have reasonably foreseen that such
Wrongful Act could lead to a Claim under this policy.”).
31
See J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 42 Misc. 3d 1230(A), 988
N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. 2014).
27
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RISK THAT IS UNINSURABLE AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY

Even when insurers would like to provide coverage, certain losses
or risks are deemed uninsurable as a matter of public policy. One common
example is punitive damage awards, which a number of states consider
uninsurable based on public policy grounds.32 Not surprisingly, most states
also prohibit insurance coverage for conduct that is intended to cause
injury. 33 Recently, D&O insurers have attempted to use the intentional
harm public policy exception to preclude coverage for SEC settlements,
though the efficacy of this argument remains to be seen. 34 The issue of
whether restitutionary or disgorgement payments may be considered an
insurable loss has not been conclusively established by each state, but a
number of cases suggest that such insurance coverage may not be
allowed.35

32
See generally McCullough, Campbell & Lane LLP, Chart of Punitive
Damages by State, http://www.mcandl.com/puni_chart.html (last visited Dec. 5,
2015); See also Nw. Nat’l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1962)
(excluding coverage for punitive damages and comparing insurance coverage for
punitive damages to insurance coverage for criminal liability.).
33
Debates exist as to how subjective the intent must be in order to be
considered an intentional act that cannot be covered. See City of Carter Lake v.
Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1058-1059 (8th Cir. 1979) (an act is
intentional and uninsurable if actor knew or should have known that there was a
substantial probability that his conduct would produce such a result); See also
Physicians Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Swanson, 58 Ohio St. 3d 189, 193 (1991) (act is
intentional where the insured subjectively intended to produce the particular
result).
34
See J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 126 A.D.3d 76, 88 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2015).
35
See generally Katherine C. Skilling, Coverage for Ill-Gotten Gains?:
Discussing the Uninsurability of Restitution and Disgorgement, 72 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1077 (2015) (surveying recent case law addressing the insurability of
disgorgement payments); See e.g. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 272
F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2001) (excluding coverage for a restitutionary payment
based on the language of the policy and finding that a “loss” within the meaning of
the policy could not include the restoration of an ill-gotten gain); Conseco, Inc. v.
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 2002 WL 31961447, at *16 (Ind. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 31, 2002) (where portion of settlement of securities class action and
derivative litigation constituted ill-gotten gains, coverage was unavailable because
settlement was not a loss under the policy); Dobson v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co.,
2012 WL 2708392, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2012) (excluding from coverage
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CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CHARGING DECISION
GUIDELINES

The criminal justice system in the United States is intended to
further the goals of deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation,
and restitution. These goals endure whether the subject of a criminal
investigation is an individual or a corporation, and irrespective of the
nature of the purportedly illegal conduct at issue. Nonetheless, distinctions
between so-called “white collar crimes” and other forms of crime have
resulted in debates as to whether and to what extent subjecting corporations
to criminal liability furthers the underlying goals of our criminal justice
system. 36 In the 1990’s, as the number of corporations facing criminal
charges increased, it appeared to many as though decisions as to whether to
charge corporations were unpredictable. In response to complaints that
there were no uniform rules in deciding whether to bring charges in
corporate cases,37 then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr. released
the first set of guidelines on indicting corporations, in a memorandum titled
“Bringing Charges Against Corporations,” (Holder Memorandum).38 These
claims seeking restitution for fraud in the underlying action, and also breach of
fiduciary duty claim to the extent that it was based on the same restitution
allegations). But see U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n et al. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 2014
WL 3012969 at *3 (D. Minn. July 3, 2014) (finding that a restitutionary
“settlement is not uninsurable under Delaware law because no Delaware authority
has held that restitution is uninsurable as a matter of law” and distinguishing the
case from Level 3 based on the policy language).
36
Compare Sara S. Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1482 (2009) (arguing that corporate criminal
liability continues to makes sense and is preferable to a system in which
corporations are not subject to criminal liability) with Albert W. Alschuler, Two
Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359,
1369-1370, 1372, 1376 (2009) (arguing that subjecting corporations to criminal
liability unnecessarily punishes innocent shareholders and creates irresolvable
conflicts of interest, while not substantially furthering the goals of our criminal
justice system).
37
In a 2006 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Holder explained that
“back in 1999 there were a group of private practitioners complaining that there
was no uniformity in the way in which prosecutors decided to indict corporations”
and that the Holder memorandum was a response to these complaints. See Peter
Lattman, The Holder Memo and its Progeny, WALL STREET J. LAW BLOG (Dec. 13,
2006), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/13/the-holder-memo/.
38
Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to
Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against
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guidelines have subsequently been amended and updated a number of times
to reflect perceived inadequacies or new developments in corporate crime.
A.

THE GUIDELINES UP UNTIL 2015

In 1999, the Holder Memorandum memorialized Chapter Eight of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ 39 consideration of a corporation’s
cooperation as a factor in making charging decisions40 and combined the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines with the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual to create a
directive for prosecutors to make charging decisions in the corporate
context. 41 The Holder Memorandum emphasized the “substantial federal
interest in indicting the corporation,” and laid out non-mandatory
guidelines that a prosecutor could, but was not obligated to consider in
deciding how to charge a corporation. 42 However, the Holder
Memorandum also suggested that prosecutors should utilize NPAs or DPAs
as a mechanism of pre-trial diversion that would reward cooperation.
Specifically, the Holder Memorandum set forth eight factors for
prosecutors to consider:
1.
The nature and seriousness of the offense,
including the risk of harm to the public, and applicable
policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of
corporations for particular categories of crime;
2.
The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the
corporation, including the complicity in, or condonation of,
the wrongdoing by corporate management;

Corps. (June 16, 1999), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF [hereinafter Holder Memorandum].
39
Chapter Eight was incorporated into the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in
response to the increase of corporate criminal prosecutions that occurred during the
1990s. Specifically, Chapter Eight sought to ensure that the sanctions imposed
upon corporations provided adequate deterrence and incentivized the adoption and
maintenance of effective mechanisms for discovering, reporting, and preventing
criminal conduct within the corporation. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION
ANNUAL REPORT (1991), http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/1991/1991federal-sentencing-guidelines-manual.
40
Holder Memorandum, supra note 38.
41
Id.
42
Id. at Part II (internal citations omitted).
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3.
The corporation's history of similar conduct,
including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement
actions against it;
4.
The corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure
of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the
waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product
privileges;
5.
The existence and adequacy of the corporation's
compliance program;
6.
The corporation's remedial actions, including any
efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance
program or to improve an existing one, to replace
responsible management, to discipline or terminate
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the
relevant government agencies;
7.
Collateral
consequences,
including
disproportionate harm to shareholders and employees not
proven personally culpable; and
8.
The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as
civil or regulatory enforcement actions.43
The Holder Memorandum was replaced in 2003 when then-Deputy
Attorney General Larry Thompson released the “Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations” (Thompson Memorandum).44 The
Thompson Memorandum included the same eight factors that had been
enumerated in the Holder Memorandum, but added the additional factor of
“the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the

Id.
See generally Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen.,
on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Busienss Organizations to to Heads of
Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_
dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum].
43
44
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corporation’s malfeasance.”45 While the Holder Memorandum’s factors had
merely been advisory, consideration of the Thompson Memorandum’s
factors, in charging decisions, was mandatory. 46 In another significant
departure from the Holder Memorandum, the Thompson Memorandum
underscored that only rarely should individuals not be pursued, irrespective
of whether the corporation offers to plead guilty. 47 The Thompson
Memorandum further emphasized the value of pre-trial diversion strategies
(such as NPAs or DPAs) and “permit[ted] a non prosecution agreement in
exchange for cooperation when a corporation's timely cooperation appears
to be necessary to the public interest and other means of obtaining the
desired cooperation are unavailable or would not be effective.”48
In December of 2006, the DOJ overhauled its guidelines for
charging decisions in corporate criminal investigations with “The
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations” (McNulty
Memorandum). 49 The McNulty Memorandum sought to “expand[] upon
the [DOJ’s] long-standing policies concerning how [it] evaluate[s] the
authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation with a government
investigation.” 50 Specifically, the McNulty Memorandum was primarily
intended to address public concern regarding a cooperating corporation’s
waiving of attorney-client privilege and the potential for prosecutors to
consider a corporation’s advancement of attorney’s fees in making
charging decisions.51 In a public statement concerning the guidelines, then-

Id. at 3.
See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The
Thompson Memorandum sets forth nine factors that federal prosecutors must
consider in determining whether to charge a corporation or other business
organization.”) (emphasis added).
47
Thompson Memorandum, supra note 44, at 2. Notably, the Memorandum
specifically stated that “only rarely should provable individual culpability not be
pursued.” (emphasis added). Thus, it is within the prosecutor’s discretion to
determine what constitutes “provable” culpability.
48
Thompson Memorandum, supra note 44, at 6.
49
See generally Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys, regarding Principles
of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs., http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/
2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum].
50
Id. at 2.
51
Thompson Memorandum, supra note 44; See also Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy
A. Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Proseuction Agreements on Corporate
45
46
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Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty stated that they were intended to
“further promote public confidence in the [DOJ], encourage corporate
fraud prevention efforts, and clarify [the DOJ’s] goals without sacrificing
[its] ability to prosecute these important cases effectively.”52
The Holder, Thompson and McNulty Memoranda’s emphasis on
the value of pre-trial diversion methods resulted in a proliferation of the use
of DPAs and NPAs to resolve corporate criminal investigations. Indeed,
between 2001 and 2014, prosecutors entered into 306 DPAs and NPAs
with corporations. 53 In the majority of situations in which a corporation
entered into a DPA or NPA, officers or employees of the corporation were
not charged.54 When individual employees were prosecuted, the individuals
were typically not high-level executives and, if convicted, received short
terms of imprisonment (if any) and paid on average a fine of $382,000.55
Despite statements in prior iterations of the guidelines that individuals
should be pursued even when a corporation cooperates,56 the general public
consensus has been that the individuals responsible for corporate crimes
rarely face criminal responsibility for their conduct.57

Governance: Evidence From 1993-2013, 70 BUS. L. 61, 77 (2014) (discussing how
the McNulty Memorandum differed from prior guidelines).
52
Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prepared
Remarks at the Lawyers for Civil Justice Membership Conference Regarding the
Dep’ts Charging Guidelines in Corporate Fraud Prosecutions (Dec. 12, 2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag_speech_061212.htm.
53
Brandon L. Garret, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV.
1789, 1791 (2015).
54
See id. (noting that of the 306 DPAs or NPAs, “only 34%, or 104
companies, had officers or employees prosecuted, with 414 total individuals
prosecuted.”).
55
See id. (explaining that “of the individuals prosecuted in these cases,
thirteen were presidents, twenty-six were CEOs, twenty-eight were CFOs, and
fifty-nine were vice-presidents” and that only 42% of those individuals who were
convicted received any jail time, with “the average sentence, including those who
received probation but no jail time, [being] eighteen months.”).
56
See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 44, at 2 (explaining that, “because
a corporation can act only through individuals, imposition of individual criminal
liability may provide the strongest deterrent against future corporate wrongdoing.
Only rarely should provable individual culpability not be pursued, even in the face
of offers of corporate guilty pleas.”).
57
See e.g., James B. Stewart, In Corporate Crimes, Individual Accountability
is Elusive, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/
business/in-corporate-crimes-individual-accountability-is-elusive.html?_r=0.
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A FUTURE OF INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE YATES
MEMORANDUM

On September 9, 2015, Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian
Yates released a memorandum to the DOJ’s prosecutors titled “Individual
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing” (hereinafter Yates
Memorandum). 58 Like the Holder, Thompson, and McNulty Memoranda
that preceded it, the Yates Memorandum set forth guidelines as to how to
make charging decisions in the corporate context. Unlike its predecessors,
however, the Yates Memorandum encouraged prosecutors to “seek
accountability from the individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing.” 59
Previously, corporations typically settled claims and the DOJ had generally
opted not to pursue cases against individuals except in the most egregious
instances involving fraud. Specifically, the Yates Memorandum outlined
six “key steps” that were intended to bolster the government’s pursuit of
individual wrongdoing:
1.
In order to qualify for any cooperation credit, the
corporation must provide investigators with all relevant
facts related to the individuals responsible for the
misconduct.
2.
Both criminal and civil corporate investigations
should focus on individuals from the inception of the
investigation.
3.
Criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate
investigations should be in routine communication with
one another.
4.
Absent extraordinary circumstances or approved
departmental policy, the government will not release
culpable individuals from civil or criminal liability when
resolving a matter with a corporation.

See generally Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys regarding Individual
Accountability for Corp. Wrongdoing, http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/
download [hereinafter Yates Memorandum].
59
Id. at 2.
58
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5.
Government attorneys should not resolve matters
with a corporation without a clear plan to resolve related
individual cases and memorialize any declination as to
individuals in such cases.
6.
Civil attorneys should consistently focus on
individuals as well as the company and evaluate whether to
bring suit against an individual based on considerations
beyond that individual’s ability to pay.60
IV.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DPAS/NPAS AND
CORPORATE INSURANCE COVERAGE

Prosecutors are aware of the presence of corporate insurance
coverage when they negotiate and enter into NPAs and DPAs. This
awareness is demonstrated through the inclusion of provisions in some
NPAs or DPAs specifically concerning the potential availability of insurer
funds to cover, either in part or in its entirety, the penalty that the
corporation has agreed to pay. The 2005 DPA between KPMG and the
USAO, for the Southern District of New York,61 serves as a particularly
illustrative example of the extent to which the prosecutor may consider a
corporation’s insurance coverage in setting the terms of an agreement. The
KPMG Agreement provided in relevant part that,
KPMG has represented to the United States that no portion
of the $456,000,000 that it has agreed to pay to the United
States under the terms of this Agreement will be covered
by any insurance policy in existence at the time of the
conduct alleged in the Information or at the time any notice
of claim was made to its insurer(s), which representation
was material to the United States in determining KPMG’s
ability to make full restitution and pay penalties to the
United States, which amounts, in the Government’s view,
were far in excess of the $456,000,000 agreed to herein.

Id.
Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Att'y for S.D.N.Y., to Robert S. Bennett,
KPMG Counsel (Aug. 26, 2005), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/
documents/kpmgdeferred.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2015) [hereinafter KPMG
Agreement].
60
61
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KPMG agrees that, in the event that any portion of
KPMG’s $456,000,000 obligation to the United States is
ultimately covered by insurance, 50 percent of any
insurance funds received by KPMG shall be remitted to the
United States. The payment to the United States of a
portion of the amounts received from insurance shall be
over and above the $456,000,000 that KPMG has agreed to
pay, but in no event shall the total payments made by
KPMG to the United States (which total payments include
both the underlying $456,000,000 and insurance proceeds)
exceeds $600,000,000. In addition, KPMG agrees that it
will not enter into any agreement or understanding with its
insurance carrier(s) to receive insurance coverage for any
portion of that $456,000,000 in exchange for increased
insurance premium payments made by KPMG in the
future.62 (emphasis added)
This provision is noteworthy in several respects. First, it indicates
that the USAO may take into account the extent to which a payment will
come directly out of the company coffers (meaning that there is no
insurance coverage for it) in deciding the amount of the penalty. The
USAO here considered the availability of insurance funds “material” in
agreeing to a $456,000,000 penalty, and implied that a larger amount
would have been preferable but considerations of KPMG’s solvency and
capacity to pay militated against a higher figure. In requiring that, should
KPMG be entitled to insurance coverage for any portion of the
$456,000,000 payment, KPMG was obligated to remit fifty percent of all
funds resulting from such coverage up to a total payment of $600,000,000,
but only requiring KPMG to pay $456,000,000 in the event that no
insurance coverage was available, the agreement suggests that the USAO
would have preferred a penalty of $600,000,000, but recognized that such a
sum might jeopardize the solvency of KPMG63 or reduce the likelihood that

Id. at 3-4.
It is worth noting that this agreement was entered into just a few years after
the collapse of the accounting firm Arthur Anderson, which many attribute directly
to the firm’s 2002 indictment by the DOJ for obstruction of justice charges
resulting from their accounting work for Enron. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey,
Anderson’s Fall From Grace, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 917 (2003) (discussing the
collapse of Arthur Andersen and noting that the DOJ should have known that an
62
63

368

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 23

KPMG would be willing to enter into the agreement. Second, by forbidding
KPMG from entering into future insurance arrangements that would
provide coverage for the $456,000,000 penalty, the agreement explicitly
contemplates that the conduct admitted to by KPMG 64 is the type of
conduct which may be insurable and is not necessarily uninsurable due to
public policy or state law. One possible implication of provisions like that
in the KPMG Agreement is that the governmental agency entering into the
agreement with the defendant corporation may attempt to structure the
terms of the agreement and the statement of facts in such a way as to avoid
completely precluding insurance coverage for the conduct at issue. This
would make sense if the governmental agency’s goal is to optimize the
amount of money that is recoverable from the defendant corporation.
Where the prosecuting agency is less interested in merely
recovering funds (restitution), irrespective of whether they come directly
from the corporation or are recouped from an insurer, an NPA or DPA may
explicitly prohibit the stipulated penalty from being paid by the
corporation’s insurer. For instance, the 2004 DPA between Computer
Associates International and the USAO for the Eastern District of New
York stipulated that Computer Associates International “will not, in
connection with the monies it pays into the Restitution Fund, seek, obtain
or accept any reimbursement or other payments or credits from any insurer
of [Computer Associates International] or of any of its divisions or
subsidiaries” in order to satisfy the terms of the agreement.65 In January of
2015, the SEC entered into a DPA with PBSJ Corporation resolving their
FCPA violations and requiring PBSJ to pay a $3,407,875 penalty and
indictment would deal the firm a fatal blow); Peter Lattman, SAC Capital is
Indicted, and Called a Magnet for Cheating, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2015),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/sac-capital-is-indicted/?_r=0 (explaining
that the justice department’s indictment of Arthur Andersen “lead[] the firm to
collapse and terminate 28,000 jobs.”).
64
See Press Release, DOJ, KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal
Violations in Relation to Largest-Ever Tax Shelter Fraud Case (Aug. 29, 2005),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2005/August/05_ag_433.html (noting that
KPMG admitted that it had “design[ed], market[ed] and implement[ed] illegal tax
shelters” by concocting “tax shelter transactions-together with false and fraudulent
factual scenarios to support them-and targeted them to wealthy individuals who
needed a minimum of $10 or $20 million in tax losses so that they would pay fees
that were a percentage of the desired tax loss to KPMG, certain law firms, and
others instead of paying billions of dollars in taxes owed to the government.”).
65
United States v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc., No. 04-837 (ILG) (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 22, 2004).
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prohibiting PBSJ from “seeking or accepting reimbursement or
indemnification from any source, including, but not limited to, payment
made pursuant to an insurance policy or employment contract, with regard
to any civil monetary penalty paid pursuant to this Agreement.”66 Almost
identical prohibitions exist in a number of other DPAs. 67 As is outlined
above, there is direct evidence that the prosecuting agency may take into
consideration the potential existence of insurance coverage when
determining the appropriate dollar amount for a penalty. To what extent a
prosecuting agency may be willing to consider the availability of insurance
coverage when determining the actual terms of the agreement is a more
complicated question.
V.

WHEN EXPECTED COVERAGE VANISHES: LEARNING
FROM THE PAST AND ANTICIPATING THE IMPACT OF
THE YATES MEMORANDUM ON COVERAGE

DPAs and NPAs between a corporation and governmental agency
do not exist in a vacuum. The corporate conduct that gave rise to the
criminal investigation will in almost all cases result in some form of civil
litigation in which the corporation could face massive additional monetary
liabilities. The availability of insurance funds to cover the costs (attorney’s
fees, lost business and the like) as well as any potential findings of liability
associated with these civil litigations can be essential to maintaining the
solvency of the defendant corporation. There are a number of ways in
which the contents of an NPA or DPA can impact civil proceedings 68

Id.
See e.g., Regions Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM’N, http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Regions_DPA.pdf
(Requiring Regions “to refrain from seeking or accepting reimbursement or
indemnification from any source, including, but not limited to, payment made
pursuant to an insurance policy or employment contract, with regard to any civil
penalties paid pursuant to this Agreement or to the Federal Reserve Board related
to or in com1cction with the conduct described in Paragraph 6.”).
68
NPAs and DPAs can also have unanticipated collateral impacts on a
corporation’s capacity to enter into contracts for work with the government and
may even indirectly preclude a corporation from entering into a contract with
another corporation if that corporation is functioning as a government contractor.
See Stephanie Martz, Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 29 THE
CHAMPION 43 (2005) (explaining that “the Federal Acquisition Regulations state
that only ‘adequate’ evidence of fraud need be present to result in a suspension
66
67
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arising from the same or intimately related conduct. On a basic level, the
admissions of guilt and narrative contained in a statement of facts can be
used as evidence against the corporation in a later civil proceeding, 69
increasing the likelihood that it will be found civilly liable as well as the
amount it will be required to pay.70 Additionally, most NPAs and DPAs
prohibit the corporate defendant from publicly contesting or disputing its
admission of wrongdoing, so-called “muzzle clauses”. 71 In addition to
directly affecting civil litigation, admissions contained in the statement of
facts, particularly coupled with the prohibitions on conduct (such as
“muzzle clauses”), may even jeopardize a corporate defendant’s claims for
non-third-party/liability insurance coverage.72

from government contracting” and how “certain flow-down provisions can prevent
other government contractors from doing business with a debarred entity.”).
69
See Sarah Kelly-Kilgore & Emily M. Smith, Corporate Criminal Liability,
48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 421, 453 (2011) (noting that a corporate defendant's
admission of wrongdoing “will be admissible in subsequent civil litigation and
disclosures will likely be discoverable”); Michael R. Sklaire & Joshua G. Berman,
Deferred Prosecution Agreements: What is the Cost of Staying in Business?,
WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (June 3, 2005), at 2 (“While a company is not required to
admit guilt as part of the agreement, the company very often will be required to
stipulate to the Government's presentation of facts--a stipulation that a plaintiff will
seek to use against the corporation in a later civil proceeding.”).
70
See Martz, supra note 68 (“for corporations, the ripple effect of these
admissions could be devastating. To the extent outstanding shareholder suits are
not resolved in the agreement, public disclosures of wrongdoing could operate as
admissions, and the information pertaining to these admissions could very well be
discoverable….There would seem to be only one avenue left once companies have
agreed to extensive factual admissions—to settle.”).
71
These provisions have been called “muzzle clauses” by some commentators.
See generally Michael Koehler, The ‘Muzzle’ Clause, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 26,
2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-muzzle-clause; see also Cort E.
Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail” Effect and the Impact on the
Justice Department’s Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (2014)
(discussing the standard provisions contained in modern DPAs and NPAs).
72
Third-Party/Liability insurance provides coverage to the insured for the
costs of the harms that happen to others as a result of the insured’s conduct,
whereas first-party insurance is coverage for harms that can happen to the
individual or corporate entity itself. On a basic level, Third Party/Liability
Insurance shifts the risk of liability for potential tort claims away from the insured
and onto the insurer.
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PRE-YATES INSURANCE ISSUES CREATED BY DPAS AND NPAS

Beyond the potential that a DPA will jeopardize insurance
coverage for the costs of related civil litigation, there is also the possibility
that the admissions contained within a DPA, which cannot be contested due
to the non-contradiction “muzzle clauses”, will be used directly by an
insurer to preclude a corporation from receiving coverage under a nonliability or first-party policy. The circumstances that followed the DPA
between FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FEOC) and the DOJ73
provide a perfect example of this type of unanticipated consequences to an
unrelated insurance policy.
On January 20, 2006, FEOC entered into a DPA regarding false
statements that it had allegedly made to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, concerning the safety of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
Station located in northwest Ohio.74 Specifically, FEOC admitted that its
employees, acting on its behalf, knowingly made false statements to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in an attempt to mislead them into
believing that the power station at Davis-Besse was safe to operate beyond
December 31, 2001. 75 Notably, in the DPA’s statement of facts, FEOC
admitted that it had failed for years to properly maintain its corrosion
program.76 In addition to these admissions, the FEOC DPA included a noncontradiction clause that stated, “FirstEnergy agrees that it shall not,
through its attorneys, agents, or employees, make any statement, including
in litigation, contradicting the statements of facts, or its representations in
this agreement.”77 In the event that the DOJ determined that the FEOC had
materially breached the terms of the agreement, the DOJ “may prosecute
FEOC for any violations known to it at that time, including the conduct
described in the Statement of Facts…and in any such proceeding the

73
FirstEnergy News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Nuclear Operating Company
to Pay $28 Million Relating to Operation of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
(Jan.
20,
2006),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/January/
06_enrd_029.html.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
See Memorandum from U.S. Att’ys Off., DOJ, on Deferred Prosecution
Agreement Between the United States and FirstEnergy Nuclear Operation
Company
(Jan.
20,
2006),
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/
documents/fenco.pdf. [hereinafter FEOC DPA].
77
Id. at 3.
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Statement of Facts shall be admissible in evidence.”78
In March of 2002, FEOC discovered that the plant’s reactor head
had been eroded by leaking acid and would need to be shut down for two
years.79 As was customary, FEOC had purchased insurance coverage80 for
business losses owing to having to shut down one of their reactors for
repairs from Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL). 81 Accordingly,
after FEOC had entered into the DPA, it filed a claim with NEIL seeking
coverage for the hundreds of millions of dollars in losses that it incurred
while the damaged reactor was shut down for repairs.82 NEIL denied FEOC
’s claim, and the parties ended up in arbitration over whether the losses
FEOC incurred during the time the reactor had to be shut down for repairs
were covered under the policy. FEOC ’s policy excluded coverage for
losses incurred as a result of the intentional acts of the insured. 83 In the
NEIL arbitration, FEOC argued that it had done nothing to intentionally
cause the corrosion damage to the reactor head at Davis-Besse, and thus
was entitled to coverage under the policy. 84 On December 18, 2006, in
support of this position, the FEOC submitted an analysis, prepared by

Id. at 2-4.
See Tom Henry, Regulators Skeptical of Davis-Besse Report, THE TOLEDO
BLADE
(May
19,
2007),
http://www.toledoblade.com/frontpage/2007/
05/19/Regulators-skeptical-of-Davis-Besse-report.html.
80
For an in-depth discussion of the insurance system for nuclear energy, see
Taylor Meehan, Lessons From the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industry Indemnity Act
for Future Clean Energy Compensatory Models, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 339 (2011).
81
See Tom Henry, FirstEnergy Drops Insurance Claim, THE TOLEDO BLADE
(Dec. 8, 2007), http://www.toledoblade.com/Energy/2007/12/08/FirstEnergydrops-insurance-claim.html.
82
See Joseph G. Block & David L. Feinberg, Look Before You Leap: DPAs, NPAs
and the Environmental Criminal Case, A.L.I.-A.B.A. BUS. L. COURSE MATERIALS J. 5
(Feb. 2010), https://www.venable.com/files/publication/4307e686-a055-41ca-9150b2ccfd550365/presentation/publicationattachment/83ca143f-8819-4478-8422-b820340f
a10d/cmj1002-block_feinberg.pdf.
83
Id. This is based largely on concerns for moral hazard, as excluding
recovery for intentional losses discourages insureds from purposefully causing
losses for which they know they will be able to recover. See generally
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: LIABILITY INSURANCE § 34 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1 Apr. 11, 2016) (noting that insurance for intentional acts may
“insulat[e] the insured from the financial consequences of such liability [which]
would contravene the public purpose of the liability.”).
84
See FirstEnergy and Davis-Besse, OHIO CITIZEN ACTION (Dec. 6, 2015),
http://www.ohiocitizen.org/campaigns/electric/nucfront.html.
78
79
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Exponent Failure Analysis Associates and Altran Solutions Corporation,
(Exponent Report) of the root cause of the erosion that had resulted in the
closing of the reactor at Davis-Besse as expert testimony in the NEIL
arbitration.85 The Exponent Report maintained that most of Davis-Besse's
old head had deteriorated from leaky reactor acid in the final three weeks
before the February shut down.86 FEOC’s posture in the NEIL arbitration
that it had done nothing to intentionally cause the corrosion which
necessitated a shut down, was irreconcilable with its admissions in the
DPA that it had failed to properly maintain a corrosion program for the
Davis-Besse reactor. 87 Thus, if FEOC continued to dispute the denial of
coverage in the NEIL arbitration, it was in danger of breaching the terms of
its DPA and being prosecuted for the underlying false statements to the
NRC. When the NRC learned of FEOC’s position in the NEIL arbitration,
it demanded that FEOC reconcile the Exponent Report with the admitted
statement of facts in the DPA, and threatened to refer the matter over to the
DOJ if the FEOC continued to take a position contrary to that admitted to
in the DPA. 88 Not surprisingly, FEOC promptly dropped its insurance

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co.;
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, 72. Fed. Reg. 161 (Notice Aug. 21, 2007),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/January/06_enrd_029.html.
86
Id.; see also supra note 78.
87
Supra note 76, at 8 (statement from the FEOC) (“For several years prior to
the summer of 2001, Davis-Besse emoloyees had failed to properly implement the
plant’s Boric cid Corrosion Control and COrrecitve Action programs. These
programs were designed to ensure that Davis-Besse employees discovered boric
acid leaks, identified their sources, documented their extent, and dealt with any
corrosion properly. Since 1996, some Davis-Besse employees knew that boric acid
deposits were left on the reactor pressure vessel head from outage to outage. Some
employees also knew that the service structure surrounding the reactor pressure
vessel head impeded inspection of some of the nozzles. Inspection and cleaning
steps under the Boric Acid Corrosion Control program were not performed
properly during the refueling outages in 1996, 1998, and 200. Instead, Davis-Besse
engineers prepared analyses without removing all of the boric acid. See FEOC
DPA at B-2.”).
88
See JONATHON S. SACK & ELIZABETH HAINES, MORVILLO, ABRAMOWITZ,
GRAND, IASON, ANELLO & BOHRER, P.C., Be Careful What You Wish For: How
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements Can Be Used in Civil Litigation,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.bna.com/deferred-and-nonprosecution-agreements/.
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coverage claim.89
At the time the DOJ and FEOC entered into the DPA, it seems as
though neither party specifically contemplated the impact that such an
agreement would have on FEOC’s first-party insurance coverage from
NEIL. FEOC filed its claim with NEIL only shortly after entering into the
DPA.90 Given that FEOC dropped its claim for reimbursement from NEIL
as soon as it was made aware that it may have been in breach of the DPA,
FEOC would likely not have filed or argued its claim with NEIL as it did if
it believed that such acts would constitute violations of the DPA. This is
not to say that FEOC would have refused to enter into the DPA if it had
considered this consequence, but it may have impacted the way in which it
negotiated the DPA and how it chose to pursue its claim with NEIL.
B.

SPECIFIC ISSUES ARISING POST-YATES MEMORANDUM

NPAs and DPA’s capacity to impact insurance coverage, and the
attendant implications for prosecutorial discretion in drafting and entering
into agreements, will persist under the new guidelines emphasizing
individual accountability. However, the Yates Memorandum also
introduces a host of other potential insurance issues for corporations.
Unlike the prior memoranda, the Yates Memorandum does not underscore
the necessity for prosecutors to continue to consider the collateral
consequences of criminal conviction when making charging decisions. But,
it specifically states that a decision not to charge a potentially culpable
individual should not be dependent upon that individual’s capacity to pay.91
It remains to be seen whether, and to what extent, charging decisions for
individuals will take into consideration the potential collateral
consequences for the corporation. Thus, the discussion below regarding
potential collateral insurance implications for corporate entities may also
prove useful to counsel for individuals facing potential criminal charges for
their corporate conduct.
In requiring that corporations “identify all individuals involved in
or responsible for the misconduct at issue, regardless of their position,
status or seniority, and provide to the Department all facts relating to that

See Tom Henry, FirstEnergy accepts blame for Davis-Besse oversight, THE
TOLEDO BLADE (JUNE 15, 2007), http://www.toledoblade.com/frontpage/2007/06/
15/'-accepts-blame-for-Davis-Besse-oversight.html.
90
See supra note 84.
91
Yates Memorandum, supra note 58, at 6.
89
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misconduct” and cannot “decline[] to learn of such facts” in order to
receive any cooperation credit,92 the Yates Memorandum could give rise to
several new forms of liability for the corporate entity. First, individual
employees may attempt to pursue claims against the corporate entity
arising out of the corporation’s actions in turning over information to the
government. Second, the prohibition on a corporation “declining to learn of
such facts” may create a new breed of derivative shareholder suit, based on
the theory that a corporation who fails to receive cooperation credit had
inadequate internal mechanisms for gathering and retaining “all facts
relating to [the misconduct at issue].” Presently, corporate general liability
insurance policies may not be drafted so as to provide coverage for such
types of liability. Thus, corporations should consult with their insurers in
order to ensure that they obtain a policy that would be inclusive of such
risks.
A corporation’s capacity to be reimbursed by its Side B D&O
policy may be jeopardized in situations where the corporation has caused
its director or officer to face the criminal investigation or proceeding for
which he is entitled to receive, at the very least, the advancement of
attorney’s fees. Thus, corporations may find themselves in a position where
they turn over documents or information supporting an investigation or
indictment of one of their executives, all the while knowing that they will
have to, at least initially, pay the legal fees for such executive in the
proceeding. Furthermore, depending on the language of their Side B D&O
policy, in the event that the executive is convicted of a crime based on the
information that they turned over (and they are thus unable to indemnify
him as a matter of law), their D&O insurer could decline to reimburse their
indemnification 93 if the policy excludes coverage for losses that are
unindemnifiable as a result of the corporation’s own actions. Where the
corporate entity and the executive officer are both deemed “insureds” under
Id.
The defense costs for individuals in white-collar cases can be enormous.
Even for a large corporation, the capacity to recover advanced defense costs from
its D&O insurer can be important. See e.g,. Walter Pavlo, The High Cost of
Mounting a White-Collar Criminal Defense, FORBES (May 30, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2013/05/30/the-high-cost-of-mounting-awhite-collar-criminal-defense/; Peter Lattman, Dealbook, Goldman Stuck with
Defense Tab, Awaiting Payback, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2013),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/gupta-legal-bills/ (discussing the over $30
million in defense costs associated with the insider trading case against former
Goldman Board member Rajat Gupta.).
92
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the Policy’s definition, the corporation’s deliberate act of turning over
information related to that executive officer could be sufficient to trigger
the “deliberate act” of an insured exclusion. 94 Again, corporate counsel
should look closely at the current D&O policies and discuss with their
insurers the extent to which this may create a gap in coverage.95
Another potential hazard that could create coverage gaps for an
executive under his D&O policy stems from the standard policy language
excluding coverage for claims about which an insured had “known or
should have known.” If corporations generally comply with the guideline’s
requirements regarding turning over information regarding individuals,
then it is not unreasonable to assume that an executive who was involved in
the misconduct for which a corporation is being investigated “know[s] or
should [] know” of the likelihood of an impending claim being brought
against him once he becomes aware that the corporation is cooperating. In
practice, it seems unlikely that this would eliminate coverage for the
executive here, but it would likely create disputes about which period of
time, and thus which policy, the claim falls into, which could impact the
available limits of liability, particularly where the policies at issue are from
different insurers. Yet another concern is the potential for situations in
which an insurer could deny coverage based on the contention that the
insured gave late notice of the claim to the insurer, so long as the insurer
can demonstrate that it was prejudiced by the late notice. 96 Although it
might not be good business practice on the part of D&O insurers, there is at

See J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 42 Misc. 3d 1230(A), 988
N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. 2014) (regarding exclusions that typically preclude
coverage for claims) (“The Policy “shall not apply to any Claim(s) made against
the Insured(s) … based upon or arising out of any deliberate…act or omission by
such Insured(s).”).
95
Beyond the explicit exclusions identified within a D&O policy, a
corporation may find itself unable to recover the money it advanced to its
executive for attorney’s fees if the executive is charged and is convicted or enters
into a settlement agreement in which he provides a detailed admission of his
conduct based on public policy grounds. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying
text. If the Yates Memorandum has its intended impact, and more individuals are
charged, then it is likely that there will be a commensurate increase in D&O
insurers willingness to dispute claims.
96
See Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. King, 304 Conn. 179, 201-203 (2012)
(expressing the view of the vast majority of jurisdictions that where an insurer
denies coverage due to late notice, the insurer bears the burden of proving that it
was prejudiced by the late notice.).
94
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least some potential for a late notice argument from an insurer, particularly
because most D&O policies require that notice be given to the insurer “as
soon as practicable…after the Named Entity’s Risk Manager or General
Counsel (or equivalent position) first becomes aware of the Claim.”97
In order to best avoid some of these coverage issues, corporate
counsel should consult the relevant D&O policies that could be implicated
in any action against an executive or officer that may result from corporate
cooperation, and be cognizant of the points at time in which an executive
may be deemed to have known or should have known that a claim would
be forthcoming. In particular, in cooperating with the government and
negotiating NPAs or DPAs, corporate counsel should pay close attention to
how the term “Claim” is defined in the potentially relevant D&O policies.
For instance, where claim means “a civil, criminal, administrative or
regulatory investigation of an Insured Person [meaning executive] once
such Insured Person is identified in writing by such investigating authority
as a person against whom a proceeding may be commenced,”98 the insurer
must be put on notice as soon as the named entity (meaning the corporate
entity for whom the director works) becomes aware of such an
investigation. Thus, in situations where the corporate entity knows that the
executive is likely going to be the subject to a proceeding because it is
cooperating and has turned over information on him, a Claim may have
arisen within the meaning of the policy even if the executive himself is
completely unaware of it. In an age of increased emphasis on individual
accountability in corporate crime, acting quickly to alert the insurer as soon
as the corporation begins to cooperate (perhaps even earlier) could go a
long way towards ensuring that D&O coverage will be available, or is less
likely to be contested.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Both prosecutors and corporations engage in a balancing equation
throughout the course of a corporate criminal investigation. For
prosecutors, charging decisions are supposed to be based on the
consideration of a variety of factors, and the terms of a DPA or NPA will
be impacted by both the corporation’s purportedly wrongful conduct and its
remedial or cooperative steps. For corporate entities, cooperating with a

97
See
AIG,
D&O
Policy,
http://www.aig.com/public-companydo_295_391889.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2015).
98
Id.
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government investigation, or deciding to enter into a NPA or DPA
necessitates an understanding of all the consequences that ensue from such
actions. Insurance coverage considerations are not always at the forefront
of a corporate counsel’s mind when he learns of an investigation into the
company. By addressing the potential insurance problems that may ensue
from a governmental investigation early on, and being familiar with the
particular policies likely to be implicated, a corporation can avoid
unexpected coverage pitfalls and be best situated to make decisions about
cooperation that reflect the corporation’s long-term best interests.

